Turkey and Israel — A Complex Relationship
By an IPS Staff Writer
On Turkish-Israeli relations
Since the formalization of relations between Israel and Turkey in 1949, the interactions between the two countries have been volatile. Despite these tensions, Turkey is willing to normalize relations after a time of turbulence; Israel, on the other hand, is unlikely to hurry into such a relationship. The Turkish government’s recent attempts to normalize relations with countries in the Middle East and West Asia, including Israel, are results of Turkey’s increasing isolation from Europe and its strained links with the United States. Specifically, Turkey is under pressure as a result of the normalization of ties between Israel and Arab states, as well as due to the reconciliation between its ally, Qatar, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members (including Egypt). Furthermore, Turkey is also concerned about changes in regional alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, exemplified by Turkey’s exclusion from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, formed in 2020.
A tumultuous past
The relationship between Turkey and Israel has historically been greatly affected by developments in the Palestinian Territories. On May 31, 2010, Israeli commandos killed ten Turkish activists on board the Turkish-owned ship Mavi Marmara, which attempted to break Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip (imposed after Hamas took control of the region in 2007). This incident strained Israel and Turkey’s diplomatic, intelligence, and military relationships, and tourism between the countries was harmed as well. Despite this setback, the Turkish-Israeli trade relationship has continued and even prospered.
Israel and Turkey cooperated on other matters, too. During the ongoing Syrian civil war, Israel opened a land corridor in November 2012, allowing the shipment of Turkish goods from Iskenderun to Haifa, Israel, and then on to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. When three Israelis were killed in a terrorist attack in Istanbul’s Taksim Square in 2016, Turkey offered Israel help and allowed two Israeli military planes to land at Istanbul’s civil airport. Israel and Turkey reached an agreement to normalize diplomatic relations in August 2016, six years after the Mavi Marmara incident. Since then, economic ties have held strong, including an energy agreement that promotes Israel’s natural gas exports to Europe and strengthens Turkey’s status as a regional energy hub. The Palestinian issue, on the other hand, has always destabilized bilateral relations, as it most recently did in 2018 after the United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and relocated its embassy from Tel Aviv. More recently, after Palestinians were killed during a “Great March of Return” confrontation at the Gaza border, Turkey and Israel expelled each other’s ambassadors.
America’s role
Relations between Turkey and the United States have also steadily deteriorated in recent years. President Joe Biden inherited a strained relationship marked by friction and eroding confidence. President Biden has taken a tough stance against Turkey on a number of issues, including the West Asian nation’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense missile systems and recently calling Turkey’s mass killing of Armenians in the early 20th century a genocide. The Biden administration, like the Obama administration, will likely push for Israel and Turkey to cooperate, especially in Syria. Historically, Turkey has long seen Israel as a means of making its presence felt in Washington. This changed in 2008, when an attempt to negotiate a peace settlement between Israel and Syria led by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed after Israel launched Operation Cast Lead, a major military attack on the Gaza Strip in December of that year. Israel’s intervention in Gaza, which has been the root cause of diplomatic crises between the two countries to this day, blindsided the Turkish government. Following that, Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan’s advisor and the country’s future foreign minister, shifted Turkey’s foreign policy focus to reach out to the Muslim community, framing itself as a protector of oppressed peoples. Davutoglu’s doctrine centered on the issue of Palestinian sovereignty. As the US-Turkish relationship has deteriorated, Turkey may have calculated that improving ties with Israel, as it did in the 1990s with the aid of Jewish American groups, will help its relationship with Washington.
Turkey reaches out
Since May of 2020, the prospect of normalizing the Turkish-Israeli relationship has been a point of discussion. Erdogan said in December that even though Turkey could not support Israel’s policies regarding the Palestinians, “our heart desires that we can move our ties with them to a better point.” Mesut Casin, Erdogan’s foreign-affairs adviser, said in a similar vein: “If Israel takes one move, Turkey could take two […] Perhaps in March, we will be able to resume full diplomatic relations.” These are significant indications that Turkey is seeking to capitalize on positive economic opportunities with Israel.
Israel remains apprehensive
Despite Erdogan’s diplomatic attempts, Israel remains reluctant to normalize ties with Turkey and has yet to formally respond to Turkey’s calls. The Israeli government is hesitant to re-establish ties with Turkey until it can discern the authenticity of Erdogan’s intentions. In the past, even when it was unreliable and openly hostile, Turkey was an important economic, diplomatic, and security partner for Israel. However, the situation has changed.
As bilateral engagement between Turkey and Israel has gone south, Israel strengthened ties with other countries in the Arab Gulf. In 2020, Israel signed normalization agreements with four Arab countries: Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and Morocco. Erdogan has since denounced these American-negotiated “Abraham Accords.” Israel’s significance as a regional player has grown as a result of the accords, and the state has begun to break free from its historic isolation from its neighbors.
In recent years, Israel’s defense industry has largely replaced Turkish business with Indian business. Turkey, on the other hand, has remained a vocal opponent of Israeli foreign policy since the 2008 Gaza War. Israel has been classified as a threat and its right to exist has been questioned in Turkish press, on social media, and in speeches by the ruling elite. Israel ought to also be wary of jeopardizing its relations with Greece, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, all of which are skeptical of Erdogan’s regional ambitions.
The obstacles ahead
There are three additional major hurdles preventing Israel from normalizing ties with Turkey: First, Israel decries Turkey’s alleged relationship with Hamas. Israel claims that the Turkish government has harbored Hamas militants and allowed them to guide and fund terrorist attacks and cyberattacks from Turkey. According to a Turkish official, no Hamas underground cells exist in Turkey, and the only Hamas leaders in Turkey are those sent by Israel as part of the 2011 prisoner swap that resulted in the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier who was infamously kidnapped by Hamas in 2006.
Second, Israel is alarmed by Turkey’s potential ambitions in Jerusalem. Some believe Erdogan is trying to raise his bid for leadership of the Muslim world by demanding custody of Jerusalem’s holy Temple Mount, which is currently in Jordanian hands (with limited and complex rules of access for both Jews and Muslims).
Third, with Turkey’s complicated ties to the West and Russia, as well as the rise of authoritarianism at home, Israel believes Turkey has stepped away from being a predictable and reliable actor. Last year, for the first time ever, the Israeli Defense Forces identified Turkey as a threat to Israel. In essence, Turkey and Israel have drifted apart politically and diplomatically, reducing regional stability. Other smaller hurdles to Turkish-Israeli relations have arisen, such as Israel’s outspoken support for Kurdish independence in northern Iraq, a movement opposed by Erdogan’s regime.
Reintroducing trust
Despite the decline of the bilateral relationship between Israel and Turkey over the last decade, the two countries continue to share mutual interests and there are still chances for cooperation. To take advantage of these opportunities, it is necessary to rebuild confidence and develop a constructive agenda aimed at creating diplomatic bridges. In looking towards the future of global stability, it is clear that Turkish-Israeli cooperation is unquestionably crucial.
